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ABSTRACT
Negativity towards ethnic minorities is a serious problem in Northern Ireland. Its
history of the Troubles around religious identities makes Northern Ireland a
special case in Europe. This paper examines negativity towards Muslims,
Eastern Europeans and immigrants in Northern Ireland using data from the
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey and the British Social Attitudes Survey.
The results from regressions show that anti-immigrant negativity is no more
prevalent in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in the UK. However, levels of
negativity towards Muslims and Eastern Europeans are significantly higher
than in Great Britain and have increased in recent years, particularly among
young adults aged 18–24 years, although older cohorts are more intolerant
on average. Our regression analyses found strong positive relationships
between anti-immigrant negativity, sectarianism and perceived
neighbourhood segregation. Higher education, contacts with minority
members and (religiously) mixed schooling are negatively related to
negativity towards immigrants.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 January 2017; Accepted 26 September 2017
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Introduction
Negativity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities is known to be a
problem in Northern Ireland. Hate crimes against immigrant communities in
inner-city areas of Belfast and Londonderry, such as bricks thrown through
windows, racist smearing on houses and physical attacks (Kilpatrick 2014;
McDonald 2014; The Irish Times 2015; Irish News 2016) have been reported
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so frequently in the press that Northern Ireland was even dubbed the “race
hate capital of Europe” (Lentin and McVeigh 2006; Knox 2011). Northern Ire-
land’s history of sectarian conflict around national and religious identities
(as either Protestant – British or Catholic Irish) makes the country a special
case in Europe. Hence, much of the literature has linked Northern Ireland’s
high rates of racially motivated hate crimes and the strong prevalence of
negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities to the region’s sectarian past
(Moore 1972; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Knox 2011; Savaric 2014; McKee
2015; McVeigh 2015). This view has also been the predominant public dis-
course, e.g. the former pastor John McCreedy was recently cited in the
press calling racism “the new sectarianism” (Irish News 2016).
Brewer, on the other hand, emphasized that the link between sectarianism
and racism in Northern Ireland is mainly explained by a history of colonialism
and deeply entrenched historical economic and political struggles on both
sides of the (Protestant British vs. Catholic Irish) divide, which historically
has led to a conflation of categories of sect, ethnicity and race (Brewer
1992). Following this line of reasoning, socio-economic and social structural
factors may well prove to be more important predictors of racism than sectar-
ianism. Economic and social structural factors are known predictors of nega-
tivity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities in other countries (McLaren
2003; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010), thus Northern Ireland might be less
exceptional than the dominant public discourse suggests.
We therefore ask if Northern Ireland is indeed a special case, or if factors other
than the regions’ sectarian past are the stronger predictors of negativity towards
immigrants and ethnic minorities. Other factors that may trigger negativity
towards immigrants and minorities are, e.g. growing immigrant numbers,
poverty and inequality, potentially leading to increasedperceptions ofminorities
as a threat. Like other parts of the UK, Northern Ireland has experienced a rise in
immigration from Eastern European countries since 2004, and has a very small,
but growing community of Asian and African Muslims. Rises in anti-immigrant
attitudes in recent years, especially in the wake of the 2014–15 European
refugee crisis, have been reported also for the UK and other countries (Acker-
mann and Freitag 2015; Bohman and Hjerm 2016; Tausch 2016).
This study examines trends in negativity towards immigrants and ethnic
minorities between 2004 and 2015, the most recent time-point for which
survey data are available for Northern Ireland. Negativity is operationalized
here as negative attitudes towards Eastern Europeans, Muslims and immi-
grants, as reported by the respondents of two nationally representative
annual surveys.
The first part of the analysis consists of bivariate comparisons of aggre-
gated negative attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, such as
Muslims and Eastern Europeans between Northern Ireland and the rest of
the UK. We then carry out a comparison of attitudes across age cohorts
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within Northern Ireland. The final part of the analysis consists of binary logistic
and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models using recent survey data.
The focus is on individual-level predictors of negativity towards immigrants
and ethnic minorities. The models will include the respondents’ religious
identification, whether they attended a religiously mixed versus a (Protestant
or Catholic) segregated school, the (self-reported) extent of religious segre-
gation of the neighbourhood, attitudes towards religious mixing and indi-
cators of educational attainment and employment deprivation.
Negativity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities in the
literature
The literature on out-group negativity consists of three main approaches,
contact theory (Pettigrew 1998, 2008; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Hayes
and Dowds 2006; Frølund Thomsen 2012), group threat/competition theory
(Quillian 1995; Schneider 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Van Assche
et al. 2014) and social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979;
Brewer 1993; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Coakley 2007).
Contact theory (Pettigrew 1998; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Tam et al. 2009)
posits that increased contact with minority members decreases prejudice, as
inter-group trust increases through repeated social interactions. According to
this, an increase in the numbers of out-group members should lead to
decreases in out-group negativity, as it leads to more contact opportunities.
A number of studies found evidence to support this theory both at the level
of individual contacts and the neighbourhood level (Schmid et al. 2014; Kauf-
mann and Harris 2015). A negative link between increased contact and nega-
tivity towards ethnic minorities was found in Northern Ireland (Hayes and
Dowds 2006; McKee 2015), Scandinavia and other European countries
(McLaren 2003; Frølund Thomsen 2012; Schmid et al. 2014).
Contrary to contact theory, the group threat/competition theory approach
(Quillian 1995; Schneider 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Van Assche
et al. 2014), posits that an increase in immigrant numbers triggers out-
group fears particularly among the worse-off, people in manual occupations
and with low education, as incoming migrants compete for jobs in the
lower paid sector. In the wake of the Brexit vote in the UK and Donald
Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016, both of which were to a large
extent driven by anti-immigrant sentiment, group threat theory has gained
in salience. Empirical cross-national comparisons (McLaren 2003; Schneider
2007; Borgonovi 2012, Doebler 2014, 2015) and case studies from the UK
(Ford 2008; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011), the Netherlands (Coenders and
Scheepers 2003; Billiet and De Witte 2008; Van Assche et al. 2014), Germany
(Wagner, Christ, and Pettigrew 2008) and Northern Ireland (Hayes and
Dowds 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; McKee 2015) confirmed that lower
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educational achievement and lower socio-economic status are associated
with an increased likelihood of perceiving immigrants and ethnic minorities
as a threat. Particularly in the case of Northern Ireland, group threat theory
is a plausible candidate for explaining anti-immigrant negativity, since the
history of sectarian hostility was theorized by several scholars as based on
economic and power struggles between the two (Protestant vs. Catholic)
ethnic/religious groups (Brewer 1992; Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998;
McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Brewer 2015).
Recent work by Kaufmann (2014) found that small residential areas in
England and Wales which experienced a rapid increase in immigrant
numbers over relatively short periods of time showed higher levels of
“white flight” among the majority population than areas that experienced a
slower growth in immigrant numbers (Kaufmann 2014). We cannot replicate
these findings with the available Northern Irish data. The Census does not
have data on immigrant numbers beyond 2011, and the surveys available
for Northern Ireland do not have sufficient small-area-Geography identifiers.
We do, however, have indicators of the self-reported frequency of contact
with minority members. Supporters of threat-perceptions theory would
expect increased contact with ethnic minorities to be associated with more
negativity towards them.
The third theory framework contributing to the study of out-group nega-
tivity in Northern Ireland is social identity theory. According to this theory
(Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Seul 1999; Brewer and Pierce 2005), indi-
viduals form their social identities by distancing their own group from not
accepted out-groups. Social identities are important for developing a sense
of who we are (Tajfel 1974; Brewer 1993). Where social identities are based
on out-group negativity, this negativity tends to be more persistent than
other attitudes and is therefore harder to tackle with short-term policy
measures.
Due to Northern Ireland’s history of the conflict, anxieties to preserve reli-
gious and national identities and mistrust of the religious–national “other”
have been prevalent in the region (Pehrson, Gheorghiu, and Ireland 2012).
The identity theory approach may help explain why sectarianism and nega-
tivity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities have been so tenacious in
Northern Ireland (Knox 2011; Pehrson, Gheorghiu, and Ireland 2012; Jarman
2015). However, recent research found that religious identification is on the
decline since the last Census and several authors observed a trend towards
more relaxed attitudes towards religious and national identities (Coakley
2007; Hayes and McAllister 2009; Mitchell 2013).
This paper pursues the following research questions:
Firstly, whether negative attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic min-
orities are really more prevalent in Northern Ireland than in other regions of
the UK, as some of the literature suggests (Knox 2011; Savaric 2014).
4 S. DOEBLER ET AL.
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Secondly, how does negativity towards these groups differ across age
cohorts and over time? Is negativity towards ethnic minorities and immigrants
mostly a youth-phenomenon, as is often purported in the press? Is the
younger generation in Northern Ireland less tolerant compared to older
cohorts? Has the Northern Irish population become more tolerant of immi-
grants and ethnic minorities over time?
We address our last set of research questions using multiple regression
models. Because sectarianism, negative attitudes and behaviours towards
the religious “other” have been conceptually linked to intolerance towards
other minorities in Northern Ireland (Moore 1972; Hayes and McAllister
2009; Knox 2011; McVeigh 2015), we aim to capture sectarian attitudes and
correlate these with negativity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Is
sectarianism more strongly related to negativity towards immigrants and
ethnic minorities than other variables? Is racism “the new sectarianism”
(Irish News 2016)? How are religious segregation and mixing – having
attended a religiously mixed versus segregated school and perceived religious
segregation of the respondents’ neighbourhoods related to negativity
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities?
Data
The analysis is based on data from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys
(NILT) 2004–2015 (ARK 2016) and the 2013-wave of the British Social Attitudes
Survey (BSA) (NatCen Social Research 2014).1 The NILT is undertaken by
researchers at Queen’s University Belfast and the BSA by NatCen (2014).
Both datasets are publically available at the UK Data Service. The surveys
are based on random probability samples, were gathered each year via
face-to-face interviews of approximately 1000 respondents and are represen-
tative of the populations aged 18 and older of Northern Ireland and Great
Britain.
Methods
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, to locate Northern Ireland in the
wider context of the UK, a comparison of descriptive percentages of nega-
tive attitudes towards Eastern Europeans, Muslims and immigrants is per-
formed using the 2013-waves of the NILT and BSA. The 2013-wave is the
most recent British data available on negativity towards these minorities.
Great Britain consists of 13 government office regions (North East, North
West, Yorkshire and Humbers, East Midlands, West Midlands, South West,
Eastern, inner and outer London, South East, Wales and Scotland). The
NILT data from Northern Ireland are compared to these regions and to
Great Britain as a whole.
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The second step is a cross-sectional time-series comparison of negative
attitudes towards the above-mentioned groups from 2004 to 2015 in North-
ern Ireland by age cohort. This is done to gain insights into general longitudi-
nal trends in anti-immigrant negativity and to pick up possible cohort and
period effects. Thirdly, we perform a set of OLS and binary logistic regressions
with negativity towards Muslims, Eastern Europeans and immigrants as the
dependent variables. We are interested particularly in relationships between
religious sectarianism (endorsing a sectarian attitude) and negativity
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, i.e. whether this matters over
and above the (known) effects of educational and employment deprivation.
Negativity towards ethnic minorities was operationalized via a set of survey
questions that were asked in both the NILT and the BSA. The question texts
vary only slightly between the two surveys for some of the items. We supplied
a Table in the Supplementary Online Appendix (Supplementary Appendix 1
Table 1), which lists all the dependent variables of the analysis and what
survey they are from.
The binary variables “would not accept an Eastern European/Muslim/
member of another minority as a relative by marriage” (NILT) and “would
mind a lot/a little if a close relative were to marry a person who is Eastern Euro-
pean/Muslim” were used as measures of negativity towards ethnic minorities.
The three items “immigrant workers are bad for the [Northern Irish/British]
economy” (disagreement to “are good for the economy”), “immigrants take
jobs away from people who were born in [Northern Ireland/Britain]” and “Brit-
ain’s/Northern Ireland’s culture is generally undermined by immigrants” were
added to an index to operationalize negativity towards immigrants.
Cronbach’s alpha for this index was 0.76, indicating an acceptable internal
scale consistency.
Endorsement of a sectarian attitude was operationalized as a four-point
scale computed from the following statements: “I would prefer to live in a
neighbourhood with people of only my own religion”, “I would prefer a work-
place with people of only my own religion” and “I would prefer a school with
children of only my own religion”, Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was 0.750,
indicating an acceptable internal scale consistency. The models also test,
whether living in religiously segregated areas is related to negativity
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Because the two surveys do not
contain geographical identifiers, it is not possible to measure area-segregation
directly. Instead, we computed an index of subjectively experienced religious
segregation of the areas the respondents live in (“do you think that leisure
centres/parks/libraries/shopping centres in this area are shared and open to
both Protestants and Catholics?”). The four binary items were added to a
four-point scale. Cronbach’s alpha of the scale was 0.95, indicating excellent
scale reliability. In addition, the models include binary variables for having
had regular contact with out-group members (1 = contact at least once a
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week, 0 = less than that), and whether the respondent has ever lived outside
Northern Ireland for more than six months (this includes having lived in other
parts of the UK or the Republic of Ireland). The latter variable was included
because Northern Ireland is a unique context both regarding its high levels
of religious segregation and its very low numbers of immigrants compared
to other parts of the UK, Ireland and Europe. Having lived in a more diverse
and less religiously segregated environment arguably enhances contact
opportunities with minorities.
The models control for education categories (degree, A-levels, GCSE Grade
D–G, GCSE Grade A–C as the reference category), unemployment (0 = not
unemployed, 1 = unemployed), the respondents’ religion (whether Protestant,
Catholic, no religion or other), gender (1 = female, 0 = male) and age.
Supplementary Appendix 1 Table 2 in the online appendix contains the
summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis.
Findings
Our first research question was whether negative attitudes towards immi-
grants and ethnic minorities are more prevalent in Northern Ireland than in
other regions of the UK, thus justifying to label the region the “race hate
capital of the UK” (Lentin and McVeigh 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007;
Knox 2011). To answer this, we carried out a UK-wide comparison of negative
population attitudes towards immigrants, Muslims and Eastern Europeans
using the NILT and BSA data.
Figure 1 demonstrates that Northern Ireland deserves this label only with
regard to social distance towards particular minority groups (Eastern
Figure 1. Comparison across UK regions: percentages of anti-immigrant attitudes, 2013.
Data: BSA 2013 and NILT 2013.
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Europeans and especially Muslims). Looking at negativity towards immigrants
more generally, it is clearly Wales that stands out (65 per cent are intolerant
towards immigrants), followed by the East Midlands, the North West and York-
shire (“immigrants take away jobs”), and not Northern Ireland. All these
regions showed worryingly high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in the
most recent survey data available (2013). The affected regions also have
above-average levels of deprivation and job insecurity (Gill 2015). Unsurpris-
ingly, these are also regions, where high percentages of the population
voted to leave the European Union in last year’s Brexit referendum (The
Electoral Commission 2016). While Northern Ireland is certainly not among
the most tolerant regions in the UK, it is not its “race hate capital” (Lentin
and McVeigh 2006; Knox 2011). Nevertheless, the numbers of respondents
in Northern Ireland who, in 2013, rejected Muslims (61 per cent) and
Eastern Europeans (46 per cent) as family members are cause for concern.
In addition, more recent NILT data for 2014 and 2015 showed a further
increase in the percentage unwilling to accept Muslims as family members
to 66 per cent in 2014 and 68 per cent in 2015. We do not have comparable
UK mainland data for the period after 2013, as these questions were not asked
in later rounds of the BSA, but the numbers on anti-immigrant attitudes and
recent rises in racially motivated hate crimes in England in the wake of the
Brexit referendum (Gietel-Basten 2016; Parveen and Sherwood 2016) make
clear that rising negativity towards minorities is a UK-wide problem, not just
a Northern Irish one.
The analysis now focuses on Northern Ireland. Our second set of research
questions asked how negative attitudes towards Muslims, Eastern Europeans
and immigrants differ over time and between age cohorts and whether North-
ern Ireland’s population has become more tolerant towards minorities
between 2004 and 2015. To observe longitudinal trends, we created line
charts of social distance towards Muslims and Eastern Europeans, and a
time-series of the attitude “In relation to color and ethnicity, I prefer to stick
with people of my own kind” by age cohort. We also examined a sectarian atti-
tude to assess, if the patterns overlap.
Looking at Figure 2, some clear patterns emerge: At all time-points and
across different indicators of negativity towards immigrants and ethnic min-
orities, older cohorts are more intolerant than younger cohorts. The great
exception are the 18- to 24-year-olds, who show an almost threefold increase
from 13 per cent in 2010 to 34 per cent in 2014 in endorsement of the racist
attitude “in relation to color and ethnicity, I prefer to stick with people of my
own kind” (Figure 2, upper left) – the steepest increase of all cohorts. Interest-
ingly, endorsement of this attitude among this cohort dropped by five per
cent between 2014 and 2015, but it still remains well above average. Older
cohorts also showed some increases between 2010 and 2014, but far less pro-
nounced than the youngest cohort.
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Previous discussions of negativity towards immigrants and ethnic min-
orities frequently mentioned sectarianism as an important explanatory vari-
able. Therefore, a time-series of the sectarian attitude “I prefer to live in a
neighborhood with people of only my own religion” was included (Figure 2,
upper right). The line chart of sectarianism shows a similar pattern to the
racist attitude: After declines for all cohorts between 2004 and 2009, endorse-
ment increased between 2010 and 2014. Pearson’s r of the two attitudes is
0.370. Again, the youngest cohort of 18- to 24-year-olds showed the most pro-
nounced increase from 18 per cent in 2009 to 40 per cent in 2014, followed by
a 16 per cent decrease to 24 per cent endorsement in 2015. Interestingly,
older cohorts are consistently less likely to endorse the sectarian attitude
than younger cohorts.
The lower half of Figure 2 gives the time-series of social acceptance of
Muslims and Eastern Europeans. As expected, we observe a strong decrease
in the acceptance of Muslims as a relative by marriage since 2009 across all
cohorts. This is likely a period effect. The world events of the last decade,
war on terror, ISIS terrorism and frequent anti-Muslim discourses in the
press have left their mark on population attitudes in Northern Ireland.
However, there is a large generational gap, older cohorts are consistently
and considerably more intolerant towards Muslims than younger ones. Inter-
estingly, the youngest cohort of 18- to 24-year-olds are again the exception.
They show by far the strongest decline in acceptance of Muslims (minus 30
per cent from 2013 to 2014), and by 2014 they are as intolerant towards
Muslims as the 55- to 64-year-olds. As was the case with other negative
out-group attitudes, the years 2014 to 2015 show an improvement for this
cohort, but only by 8 per cent. In 2015, intolerance of Muslims among the
youngest cohort remains well above the national average.
Figure 2. Time-series of negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities in the NILT.
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Looking at the acceptance of Eastern Europeans (Figure 2, lower right), we
see a similar, albeit milder pattern of steady decline across all age-cohorts. The
cohort difference is considerably smaller with regard to acceptance of Eastern
Europeans than acceptance of Muslims and it is decreasing – the lines almost
converge by 2014. This is due to the younger cohorts (aged <45) exhibiting
stronger declines in acceptance of Eastern Europeans than older ones. The
decline is not as steep as it was for acceptance of Muslims, but the pattern
is clear. Northern Ireland’s population has not become more tolerant
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, but less so.
The next step of the analysis tests for multivariate relationships between
social indicators and negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immi-
grants in Northern Ireland using binary logistic and OLS regressions. The
research questions now focus on how sectarianism, perceived religious segre-
gation of the respondent’s neighbourhood and having attended a religiously
mixed secondary school are related to negativity towards immigrants and
ethnic minorities. Are these factors that are unique to Northern Ireland stron-
ger predictors of negativity towards minorities than other factors that are
known to affect out-group negativity in other countries, such as education
(Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Borgonovi 2012) and employment depri-
vation (Strabac and Listhaug 2008)?
Supplementary Appendix 1 Table 3 contains the odds-ratios and confi-
dence intervals from the regression models with social distance towards
Muslims, Eastern Europeans, and “other minorities” (refusal to accept
members of each group as a relative by marriage) as the dependent variables.
The last two columns of Supplementary Appendix 1 Table 3 contain the beta
coefficients and confidence intervals of the OLS regression. The dependent
variable is our index of anti-immigrant attitudes (Table 1).
The regression models show that having a sectarian attitude (“I prefer to
live in a neighbourhood with only my own religion”), area-level religious seg-
regation (living in areas, where libraries, parks and shopping facilities are not
shared between Protestants and Catholics) and low education are the stron-
gest individual-level predictors of negativity towards ethnic minorities and
immigrants. Having attended religiously mixed, as opposed to segregated
schooling, however, is statistically significantly negatively related to anti-
immigrant attitudes, but not related to negativity towards particular ethnic
minorities. The findings of strong associations between segregation, sectarian
attitudes and negativity towards ethnic minorities lend support to identity
theory, as religious segregation and sectarianism in Northern Ireland are
both linked to nationalist identity-struggles (McVeigh and Rolston 2007;
Goeke-Morey et al. 2015). This finding indicates that when it comes to the
impact of sectarianism on attitudes towards other minorities, Northern
Ireland is indeed still a special case.
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Table 1. Social distance and negative attitudes towards different immigrant groups, NILT 2015.
Logistic regression: “Would object to having as a relative by marriage:…”
OLS regression: negative
attitudes towards immigrants
“Would object to having as a relative
by marriage:…”
Eastern Europeans Muslims Other minorities Anti-Immigrant Attitude Index
Odds-Ratios Conf. Int. Odds-Ratios Conf. Int. Odds-Ratios Conf. Int. Beta Coef. Conf. Int.
Age 1.022*** 1.013, 1.030 1.011* 1.002, 1.020 1.017*** 1.009, 1.026 0.002 −0.001, 0.004
Sex 1.027 0.778, 1.357 1.147 0.856, 1.538 0.965 0.729, 1.277 0.051 −0.028, 0.130
Protestant 1.633** 1.206, 2.213 1.636** 1.183, 2.262 1.277 0.941, 1.732 0.274*** 0.181, 0.367
No religion 2.081** 1.285, 3.368 1.209 0.733, 1.996 1.624 1.000, 2.638 0.152* 0.030, 0.273
Church attendance 1.029 0.966, 1.096 0.988 0.924, 1.058 1.046 0.982, 1.115 −0.019 −0.115, 0.076
Degree 0.656* 0.450, 0.957 0.403*** 0.272, 0.596 0.610* 0.418, 0.891 −0.178** −0.294, −0.062
A-levels 1.001 0.631, 1.587 0.729 0.448, 1.185 0.892 0.563, 1.412 0.104 −0.008, 0.215
GCSE, Grades D–G 2.156** 1.260, 3.687 1.776 0.951, 3.316 2.301** 1.339, 3.954 −0.010 −0.192, 0.172
No qualification 0.795 0.528, 1.196 1.024 0.646, 1.624 0.860 0.569, 1.299 0.197** 0.073, 0.321
Unemployed 1.078 0.663, 1.754 0.907 0.538, 1.527 1.131 0.692, 1.851 0.212* 0.001, 0.423
Urban 1.115 0.817, 1.520 1.030 0.743, 1.426 1.340 0.980, 1.831 −0.179** −0.310, −0.049
Sectarian Attitude 2.677*** 1.963, 3.649 2.566*** 1.814, 3.630 2.350*** 1.724, 3.202 0.228*** 0.142, 0.313
Perceived area-segregation 1.861*** 1.431, 2.420 1.952*** 1.432, 2.660 2.144*** 1.635, 2.810 0.043* −0.078, −0.007
Has lived abroad 0.786 0.570, 1.084 1.193 0.852, 1.670 0.965 0.698, 1.335 −0.155*** −0.245, −0.065
Attended a mixed school 1.371 0.928, 2.028 1.273 0.851, 1.905 1.425 0.960, 2.115 −0.133* −0.250, −0.016
Contact with Eastern Europeans 0.821*** 0.737, 0.913 2.689, 3.093
Contact with Muslims 0.869 0.755, 1.001
Contact with other minorities 0.696*** 0.612, 0.792
Constant 0.133*** 0.053, 0.331 0.418 0.166, 1.053 0.215** 0.084, 0.555 2.891***
-2-Log-Likelihood −618.644 −562.397 −610.501 −815.739
AIC 1271.289 1158.795 1255.002 1663.479
BIC 1355.469 1242.975 1339.183 1740.423
N 1045 1045 1045 906
Data: NILTS 2015.
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Consistent with other research and with findings on other countries
(McLaren 2003; Hayes and Dowds 2006; Hewstone et al. 2006; Tam et al.
2007; Frølund Thomsen 2012; McKee 2015), we found that regular contact (at
least once a week) withminorities makes individuals less likely to endorse nega-
tive attitudes towards them. The findings support contact theory (Pettigrew
1998; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Tam et al. 2009). The coefficient of contact
is non-significant when negativity towards Muslims is the dependent variable,
however. This is likely due to the fact that they are the smallest and most recent
minority in Northern Ireland, hence the population not living in large cities will
have had only few contact opportunities with this group.
Another finding was that Protestants and the non-religious are on average
more negatively inclined towards ethnic minorities and immigrants than
Catholics. This concurs with researchers who found negativity towards
ethnic minorities to be predominantly a phenomenon of the urban male Pro-
testant working-class (Hewstone et al. 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Tam
et al. 2007; Knox 2011; McKee 2015).
There are some interesting differences in the patterns of negativity towards
immigrants compared to particular ethnic minorities: Unemployment is sig-
nificantly positively related only to negativity towards immigrants, but unre-
lated to negativity towards particular minorities. This may lend some
support to economic competition/threat-perceptions theory (Quillian 1995;
Schneider 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Kaufmann 2014): it is plausible
that fear of labour market competition is directed at immigrants in general
more than at specific ethnic minorities because for the unemployed, any
incoming immigrant group, regardless of their ethnicity, could be a potential
competition for jobs.
Urban living and having attended a religiously mixed school, too, are statisti-
cally negatively related to negativity towards immigrants, but statistically unre-
lated to intolerance towards specific minorities. This lends some support to
contact theory. We saw from Figure 2 that all immigrant groups tend to
cluster in urban areas, hence majority members living in these areas have
more contact opportunities. Furthermore, religiously mixed schooling brings indi-
viduals in contact with at least the main religious (Catholic or Protestant) out-
group. This likely fosters acceptance of the religious–national “other”, which
may spill over into acceptance of other out-groups regardless of their ethnicity.
Discussion
This paper gave a comprehensive account of the prevalence of negativity
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland over a ten-
year period. The analysis addressed a number of research questions: We
asked whether Northern Ireland’s population does, as the media suggest,
endorse more negative attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities
12 S. DOEBLER ET AL.
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than the populations of other parts of the UK. The answer is that it depends on
what measure of out-group negativity one focuses on. Although the Northern
Irish population is considerably less tolerant towards Muslims and Eastern Eur-
opeans than the populations of other parts of the UK, the picture is reversed
with regard to negativity towards immigrants. Our comparison of anti-immi-
grant attitudes across the UK showed that Northern Ireland is by no means
the only UK region with worryingly high levels of anti-immigrant negativity.
In fact, Wales, the East Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire showed signifi-
cantly higher levels of anti-immigrant negativity among their populations
than Northern Ireland. Calling Northern Ireland the “race hate capital” of the
UK, let alone Europe, would be a gross over-generalization. Nevertheless,
negativity towards ethnic minorities is on the increase in Northern Ireland
and the numbers are cause for concern. But our analysis also showed that
negativity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities is a UK-wide problem,
not just a Northern Irish one.
The findings are interesting with regard to contact theory. Northern Ireland
is the UK region with the smallest number of immigrants, especially Muslims
and Eastern Europeans. Its Muslim population is tiny and highly clustered in
inner-city areas, and although Eastern Europeans are the largest minority,
their share among the population is nowhere near that in other parts of the
UK. Yet, Northern Ireland is the region with the highest levels of negativity
towards these particular groups. Our findings from regression models
showed that regular contact with Eastern Europeans and other minorities is
linked to more tolerance towards them. This is mirrored by other findings
in the literature (Hayes and Dowds 2006; McKee 2015).
Another finding which indirectly supports contact theory (McLaren 2003;
Hayes and Dowds 2006; Hewstone et al. 2006; Frølund Thomsen 2012) is
that having attended a religiously mixed (as opposed to segregated) second-
ary school is statistically negatively related to negativity towards immigrants.
Thus, enhanced contact with the religious “other” in school makes people
more likely to be tolerant of the religious “other” and towards other out-
groups. The fact that mixed schooling is statistically unrelated to negativity
towards Eastern Europeans and Muslims may be explained by the limited
contact opportunities with these groups, due to their small numbers. Further-
more, the analysis found that the less segregated the respondents perceive
their neighbourhood to be, the less likely are they to endorse negative atti-
tudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. The finding makes sense,
as immigrants tend to settle in less segregated neighbourhoods, which there-
fore offer more contact opportunities.
Regarding the relationship between sectarianism and negativity, we found
that the sectarian attitude is strongly linked to negativity towards all ethnic
minorities and immigrants, but its effect does not confound the effect of edu-
cation, or other variables. Sectarianism is as strong a predictor of negativity
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ew
ca
stl
e U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:5
0 0
9 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
towards ethnic minorities as a lack of education. It is, however, misleading to
call negativity towards ethnic minorities the new sectarianism. The two sets of
attitudes are strongly correlated, and, as the time-series (Figure 2) showed,
they follow a similar longitudinal pattern of cohort change, but racism has
not replaced sectarianism. Assumptions from identity theory and accounts
of the specific cultural history of competing sectarian, and (racialized)
ethnic identities in Northern Ireland (Brewer 1992; Savaric 2014; Brewer
2015) can help explain the strong association between sectarian attitudes
and negativity towards ethnic minorities that we found. According to identity
theory, (nationalistic, ethnic or sectarian) collective identities are built and
maintained through distinction from not accepted out-groups (Tajfel 1974).
It is very plausible that sectarianism in Northern Ireland, with its strong
emphasis on nationalistic/ethnic/religious identity-struggles and out-group
rejection spills over into rejecting other out-groups as well. Brewer found
this to be historically the case (Brewer 1992).
Sectarian attitudes, perceived religious segregation and low education are
the strongest predictors of negativity towards ethnic minorities and immi-
grants in Northern Ireland, followed by a lack of contact with out-group
members. Unemployment is positively related only to negativity towards
immigrants, which makes sense, given that for the unemployed, any incoming
immigrant, regardless of their ethnicity, could be perceived as an economic
threat and a competitor for jobs.
Our analysis of cohort differences over time revealed some worrying find-
ings regarding the youngest cohort of 18- to 24-year-olds: Not only did nega-
tivity towards ethnic minorities increase between 2010 and 2014 across all
cohorts, we also observed particularly strong increases among the youngest
cohort. We do not know what causes this cohort effect. One explanation
may be an increase in anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant discourses in the
press in recent years, to which the youngest cohort responded more strongly
than older cohorts. There is also the possibility of an age effect: the youngest
cohort is at an age where its members just enter the labour market – in a
climate of generally rising negativity towards ethnic minorities and immi-
grants, they are the cohort with the strongest reason to fear labour market
competition, as threat/competition theory predicts. However, these expla-
nations must remain speculative. Future studies will assess, whether the
pattern persists. The fact that at least racial prejudice (“in relation to colour
and ethnicity, I prefer to stick with my own kind”) has declined from 2014
to 2015 is a somewhat hopeful sign.
Conclusions
Negativity towards ethnic minorities and immigrants is a serious problem in
Northern Ireland and it has increased in recent years, especially among the
14 S. DOEBLER ET AL.
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young. In the wider context of rising hostility and hate incidents against immi-
grants not just in Northern Ireland, but across the whole UK in the wake of the
Brexit referendum, there is an urgent need for policies tackling the issue. Pol-
icymakers can address negativity towards ethnic minorities and immigrants
by employing measures that curtail religious and ethnic segregation and by
creating more contact opportunities with minorities. Since sectarianism and
negativity towards ethnic minorities are strongly correlated, policies that
tackle sectarianism will likely also help tackle negativity towards ethnic min-
orities and immigrants. Such policies should target all age groups, but
especially young adults. Policymakers should support and fund (new and
existing) civil sector organizations in creating shared open spaces and facili-
tate communication across communities Our results also indicate that further-
ing religiously mixed education and widening access to education among the
socio-economically deprived are promising measures to tackle out-group
negativity in Northern Ireland. Our findings have important policy implications
beyond Northern Ireland, as educational and employment deprivation and a
lack of contact opportunities with minorities have been found to be strong
predictors of negativity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities not just
in Northern Ireland, but across the UK and Europe.
Note
1. BSA data on anti-immigrant attitudes and social distance to Eastern Europeans
and Muslims were available for 2013, but not for 2014 and 2015.
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